Cf. : ontogenic adaptation, evolutionary adaptation

He then explores the question of when and how symbolic explanations are permissible and useful in addressing autonomous systems. The first step is scrutinizing the notion of a symbol, because "...in order to understand fully how the cognitive domain of such a system can operate and be modified, we must look at the dynamic regularities that arise within the system and that can be treated as symbolic events." (Varela, 1979, p. 81) This leads to delineation of two primary features of 'symbols' in natural systems, of which the one relevant here is:

"Internal Determination. An object or event is a symbol only if it is a token for an abbreviated nomic chain that occurs within the bounds of the system's organizational closure. In other words, whenever the system's closure determines certain regularities in the face of internal or external interactions and perturbations, such regularities can be abbreviated as a symbol, usually the initial or terminal element in the nomic chain."

(Varela, 1979, pp. 79-80)

Varela then invokes the example of nitrogen base triplets 'encoding' an amino acid in a cell's protein sequences. This is 'encoding' only in the sense that the triplet's occurrence is correlated with a repetitive pattern discernible in the actual / causal (i.e., 'operational') dynamics of the cell. "But such a dynamic pattern occurs entirely within the bounds of the cell's closure; the cell itself contains the 'interpretation' for the symbol. We then chose the triplet as the symbol for the amino acids by abbreviating the long sequence of chemical steps from the internal recursion where such chemical reactions normally operate." (p. 80)

In (seemingly arbitrarily) associating triplets with amino acids, an observer is using a sort of explanatory shorthand by ignoring at least some of the operations which realize the pattern of dynamics thus denoted. "To the extent that this ignoring is based on the regularities of the dynamics of an autonomous system, this symbolic description is admissible, and it plays a useful role in the study of autopoietic systems on a larger time scale ... In the molecular examples of admissible symbols, their underlying causal chains are still apparent and accessible, and we can switch from one type of description to the other with a certain ease." (p. 80)

Cf. : explanation, operational explanations, symbol, symbolic explanations

Cf. : auto-

In The Embodied Mind (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991), the term heteronomy is apparently used as a synonym for allonomy.

Cf. : autonomous description, autonomy , control, control description, heteronomy

Cf. : allopoietic machine / system

Allopoietic machines are therefore construed as such icogdo an observer. They "...have an identity that depends on the observer and is not determined through their operation, because its product is different from themselves; allopoietic machines do have an externally defined individuality." (Varela, 1979, p. 15) This last feature derives from the fact that an allopoietic machine's "boundaries are specified by an observer, who by specifying its input and output surfaces, specifies what pertains to it in its operations." (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 81; Cf. : Varela, 1979, p. 15) "Since the changes that allopoietic machines may suffer without losing their definitory organization are necessarily subordinated to the production of something different from themselves, they are not autonomous." (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 80; Varela, 1979, p. 15)

Since the ascription of allopoiesis is a functional attribution, "...an observer can describe an autopoietic component of a composite system as playing an allopoietic role through the realization of the larger system that it contributes to realizing through its autopoiesis." (Varela, 1979a, p. 52). Such an ascription neither addresses nor negates the autopoietic status of the machine so treated. "In fact, autopoietic and allopoietic descriptions of a system are complementary pairs, depending on the observer's needs. They are a particular instance of ... the universal duality between autonomous and control descriptions..." (Varela, 1979, p. 16) Cf. : autopoietic machine.

Cf. : allopoiesis, allopoietic role, autonomy , autonomous machine, autopoiesis , autopoietic machine / system, purpose

Because (by definition) an autopoietic machine's function is defined and determined by its own organization (and the maintenance of that organization), any analogous reference to an autopoietic role is descriptively meaningless.

Cf. : allopoietic machine, autopoietic machine, machine, submachine

Ultimately, however, neither Maturana nor Varela explicitly embrace this connotation of objective status. Because their delineation of 'ambience' is qualified with respect to realization, the ambient ascribed by an observer of a living system's ontogeny is a descriptive construct of the observer, and not a definitive feature of the system's organization . (See Also: Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 99) Varela (1979) occasionally refers to this construct as ambient.

For the sake of illustration, it is safe to say that ambience is equivalent in connotation to that which Winograd and Flores (1986) denote as the specific construct 'medium':

"...[W]e use the term 'medium' rather than 'environment' to refer to the space in which an organism exists. This is to avoid the connotation that there is a separation between an entity and its 'environment.' An entity exists as part of a medium, not as a separate object inside it."

(Winograd & Flores, 1986, p. 43, footnote 7)

Winograd and Flores' connotation of 'medium' being all-subsumptive (i.e., of both the system and its environs) matches the connotations given 'ambience' by Maturana and Varela (1980).

NOTE: In later (e.g., post-1985) writings, Maturana has commonly employed the term medium as an apparent surrogate for environment, although some passages can be interpreted as connoting something more like ambience. As such, it is not safe to blindly equate Maturana's later allusions to 'medium' with either Winograd and Flores' precise usage of that term or to Maturana and Varela's (1980) precisely-delineated construct of 'ambience.'

Figure AmbEnv illustrates the variant delineations of 'ambience', 'environment', and 'medium'. This figure is located within the entry for 'environment'.

Cf. : ambient, environment, medium

Cf. : ambience

This phrase is sometimes quoted as "Everything said is said by an observer...", as in the passage: "Everything said is said by an observer to another observer who can be himself or herself." (Maturana, 1978)

Cf. : observer

A more detailed overview of the context for this dichotomy (as well as Figure SymAsym illustrating it) can be found in the entry for Star.

Cf. : complementarity, Star, symmetry

Cf. : allo-

A. "...mechanistic (dynamic) systems defined as a unity by their organization. We shall say that autonomous systems are organizationally closed. That is, their organization is characterized by processes such that (1) the processes are related as a network, so that they recursively depend on each other in the generation and realization of the processes themselves, and (2) they constitute the system as a unity recognizable in the space (domain) in which the processes exist." (Varela, 1979, p. 55)

B. '...defined as a composite unity by a network of interactions of components that (i) through their interactions recursively regenerate the network of interactions that produced them, and (ii) realize the network as a unity in the space in which the components exist by constituting and specifying the unity's boundaries as a cleavage from the background...' (Varela, 1981a, p. 15)

Cf. : autonomy , autopoiesis , autopoietic machine / system, organizational closure

1.

The definitive quality of the class of systems subsuming autopoietic systems. This general class is defined by organizational closure in these systems' constitution. The concept is defined indirectly, through definition of the autonomous machine / system which exhibits this quality. The difference between autonomy and autopoiesis is that autopoietic systems must produce their own components in addition to conserving their organization and specifying their boundaries in the space of realization.

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2.

"Autonomy is the distinctive phenomenology resulting from an autopoietic organization: the realization of the autopoietic organization is the product of its operation."

(Varela, Maturana & Uribe, 1974, p. 188)

In the early literature, a label connoting "The condition of subordinating all changes to the maintenance of the organization. Self-asserting capacity of living systems to maintain their identity through the active compensation of deformations." (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 135) In this early, generic sense the term connoted "...the central feature of the organization of the living" (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. xvii; also see Maturana, 1980a, p. 45) Although it is obviously closely related, this early usage of the term should not be construed as precisely synonymous with Varela's (1979) more rigorous (and distinct) usage (1. above).

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3.

In generic usage, the notion of self-guidance or self-control -- literally, "self-law." (Varela, 1979, p. xi). The opposite of allonomy or control.

Regardless of the specific above-cited nuance employed, 'autonomy' is the central principle or heuristic around which Maturana and Varela's theories revolve. As a subject for scientific enquiry, 'autonomy' entails a significant divergence from conventional models and techniques. Much of Varela's solo work during the 1970's concentrated on developing new tools with which to address systems as autonomous machines. In doing so, he laid out a map relating (a) the characterization of a system (in and of itself) as either autonomous or allonomous (subject to extrinsic control) versus (b) the mode of representation by which said system is modeled (either in terms of its closure or its observed interactions). This summary overview of the methodological landscape is reproduced in Table CharRep below.

TABLE CHARREP: Varela's Overview of System Characterization versus System Representation
Adapted from Varela (1979) (p. 206, Table 13.1)	BASIS FOR REPRESENTATION:
BASIS FOR CHARACTERIZATION:	Closure	Interaction
Autonomy	identity connectivity indefinite recursion eigenbehavior stability	perturbations - compensations cognitive domain resilience ontogenesis
Control	coordination of parts hierarchical levels finite recursion signal flow state transitions	black box dissipative structures input - output

Table CharRep is but a sketch of elements methodologically relevant to the study of systems as autonomous unities. The reader is invited to compare this Table's contents in relation to (e.g.) the dichotomy between the recursive and behavioral views of particular unities, the distinction between symbolic and operational explanations, and other constructs concerning observation / description / explanation.

Cf. : autonomous machine / system, autopoiesis , autopoietic machine (system), closure, Closure Thesis, organizational closure

1.

The theoretical construct definitive of the manner of operation of that class of systems that includes living systems. This term, combined from the Greek auto- (self) and poiesis (creation/production), was coined by Maturana in (approximately) 1972 (Cf. Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. xvii). Often loosely translated as 'self-creation' or 'self-production', the term connotes the process or dynamic by which an autopoietic machine / system maintains its autopoietic organization (via intrinsic processes of production of components realizing this particular organization). More specifically, autopoiesis is attributed to a machine (delineated as a a network of processes) which through that network of processes produces the components that:

"(1) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and

(2) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they [the components] exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network."

(Varela, 1979, p. 13)

In the primary literature, autopoiesis is not directly defined as a process. Instead it is defined indirectly, on the basis of how an 'autopoietic machine' operates. There are, in fact, very few instances in the primary literature where 'autopoiesis' is substantively treated in and of itself, and then only as a process characteristic of 'self-production' or 'homeostatic organization' -- constructs themselves framed mechanicistically with respect to the subject system's architectonics. For example, Varela (1979, pp. 24-26) comes closest to addressing 'autopoiesis' directly in the course of discussing productions of relations in a given system:

"What makes this system a unity with identity and individuality is that all the relations of production are coordinated in a system describable as having an invariant organization. In such a system any deformation at any place is compensated for ...by keeping its organization constant as defined by the relation of the productions that constitute autopoiesis. The only thing that defines the cell as a unity (as an individual) is its autopoiesis, and thus, the only restriction put on the existence of the cell is the maintenance of autopoiesis."

(Varela, 1979, p. 26, emphasis in the original)

"...[A]utopoiesis may arise in a molecular system if the relations of production are concatenated in such a way that they produce components specifying the system as a unity that exists only while it is actively produced by such concatenation of processes. This is to say that autopoiesis arises in a molecular system only when the relation that concatenates these relations is produced and maintained constant through the production of the molecular components that constitute the system through this concatenation."

(Varela, 1979, pp. 26-27)

NOTE: Given the above distinctions and qualifications about the nature and origin of the construct 'autopoiesis', the details on what makes a composite unity (system) 'autopoietic' are therefore to be found under the entries for autopoietic machine and autopoietic organization.

The strict, though indirect, definition of autopoiesis proposed in the early papers was intended to provide a basis for overcoming vague or problematical characterizations of living systems -- particularly those which represented vitalistic explanation of biological phenomena. As Maturana (1980a, p. 45) put it, the construct of autopoiesis:

"...resulted from the direct attempt ... to provide a complete characterization of the organization that makes living systems self-contained autonomous unities, and that makes explicit the relations among their components which must remain invariant under a continuous structural transformation and material turnover."

This passage reinforces the viewpoint that it is the constitutive organization of an autopoietic system which is primary in delineating autopoiesis. This is reflected even in the less formal popular account given in The Tree of Knowledge (Maturana & Varela, 1987, 1992):

"When we speak of living beings, we presuppose something in common between them; otherwise we wouldn't put them in the same class we designate with the name 'living.' What has not been said, however, is: what is the organization that defines them as a class? Our proposition is that living beings are characterized in that, literally, they are continually self-producing. We indicate this process when we call the organization that defined them an autopoietic organization."

(Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 43, emphasis added)

Having said that, Maturana and Varela proceed (as they have consistently done in the more formal literature) to delineate the autopoietic organization as the basis for 'indicating' the process of 'autopoiesis.'

These last quotations illustrate a point which has proven somewhat problematical over the years. As mentioned at the outset, 'autopoiesis' has in fact been delineated and formally defined in terms of the constitution and operational character of an autopoietic machine or system. This definitional approach was entirely consistent with the mechanicistic perspective from which Maturana and Varela initially proceeded. To have invoked an ephemeral 'autopoiesis' (e.g., as a processual or qualitative referent) would have arguably entailed sliding into the sort of vitalistic explanation which they explicitly opposed and stringently avoided.

In other words, 'autopoiesis' is an abstract construct known solely in relation to a machine / system of a particular constitution which maintains its key constitutive character over time. Strictly speaking, autopoiesis has not been positively defined as a type of process in and of itself, even though it is clear in the context of its primary literature (e.g., Maturana & Varela, 1980) that it is the dynamic or process evidenced by, and reciprocally preservative of, the autopoietic organization / autopoietic machine. Nonetheless, it became common practice (even on occasion by Maturana and Varela themselves) to allude to 'autopoiesis' as a rhetorical shorthand connoting (in terms of process) the constitutive and operational details of a particular system. This is most evident when addressing the dynamics of an autopoietic system -- i.e., when the processes manifest in the autopoietic network comprise the referential foreground, and the mechanics of the network itself are relegated to the background.

Given the above-cited conditions, it is possibly understandable, though definitely somewhat ironic, that this indirectly- or allusively-defined shorthand term should become the de facto label for the essence of Maturana and Varela's work, as well as a common label for that work itself (Cf. 2. below). So long as such invocations retain (or at least can be linked to) the sort of mechanicistic context in which the process 'autopoiesis' is definitively framed, this is not problematical. What is problematical is explanatory invocation (and reliance upon) the process or dynamic of 'autopoiesis' absent this context. To invoke 'autopoiesis' (e.g., as 'self-production') without concomitantly explaining the constitutive elements of the system(s) for which such invocation is made, is to deny any basis for evaluating the applicability of the construct (as it was defined originally). The most well-known example of such an invocation would be that of German sociologist Niklas Luhmann, who adopted 'autopoiesis' as a processual construct in analyzing social systems, yet never (to date) bothered to explain what in his view are the key constitutive elements (e.g., 'organization', 'structure') by which such an application might be assessed in terms of Maturana and Varela's clear-cut definitional criteria.

The explanatory risk in invoking 'autopoiesis' absent attention to the machine / system manifesting it has two distinguishable (but admittedly intertwined) components. The first is that an observer may simplistically project the feature 'autopoiesis' onto a unity with which she has insufficient or imperfect observational engagement upon which to base its ascription. Phrased another way, stripping the processual construct away from the machine manifesting it opens the possibility of its mistaken attribution to something only partially or indirectly observed. Varela (1979) provides some illustration for this type of risk in writing of recognizing an autopoietic system (as distinct from autonomous systems in general):

"In general, the actual recognition of an autopoietic system poses a cognitive problem that has to do both with the capacity of the observer to recognize the relations that define the system as a unity, and with his capacity to distinguish the boundaries that delimit this unity in the space in which it is realized (his criteria of distinction). Since it is a defining feature of an autopoietic system that it should specify its own boundaries, a proper recognition of an autopoietic system as a unity requires that the observer perform an operation of distinction that defines the limits of the system in the same domain in which it specifies them through its autopoiesis. If this is not the case, he does not observe the autopoietic system as a unity, even though he may conceive it."

(Varela, 1979, p. 54)

The second, but related, explanatory risk has to do with ascribing autopoiesis to systems with which the observer / explainer may have 'proper' observational engagement, but for which the observer ignores addressing the key features of the autopoietic organization by which the process of autopoiesis is defined. Varela (1979) also addresses this issue in passing, during his discussion of ascribing autopoiesis to other (autonomous) systems (i.e., systems of similar apparent constitution or apparent mode of operation, but not 'living systems'). Varela notes that other systems, being autonomous, entail:

"...assertion of the system's identity through its functioning in such a way that observation proceeds through the coupling between the observer and the unit in the domain in which the unity's operation occurs.

What is unsatisfactory about autopoiesis for the characterization of other unities ... is also apparent from this very description. The relations that characterize autopoiesis are relations of productions of components. ... Given this notion of production of components, it follows that the cases of autopoiesis we can actually exhibit, such as living systems or model cases ..., have as a criterion of distinction a topological boundary, and the processes that define them occur in a physical-like space...

Thus, the idea of autopoiesis is, by definition, restricted to relations of productions of some kind, and refers to topological boundaries. These two conditions are clearly unsatisfactory for other systems exhibiting autonomy." [...of which Varela specifically mentions animal societies and human social institutions -- Ed.]

(Varela, 1979, p. 54, emphasis in the original)

The difference between autonomy and autopoiesis is that autopoietic systems must produce their own components in addition to conserving their organization . Autonomous machines need only exhibit organizational closure, and they are not required to produce their own components as part of their operation.

---

Cf. : allopoiesis, allopoietic machine, autopoietic machine, machine.

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2.

A label sometimes used to denote the body of Maturana and Varela's theoretical work.

---

Cf. : autopoiesis theory, autopoietic theory, theory of autopoiesis.

Cf. : autopoiesis (2.), autopoietic theory, theory of autopoiesis.

This term is used only within one paragraph in this paper, and as such it's somewhat difficult to discern whether it is being used as (a) a summary term for the 'mode of closure' evidenced in autonomous / autopoietic systems generally, or (b) a specific analogue to more clearly delineated constructs such as operational closure or organizational closure. Because the term is invoked specifically to discuss autonomy , one might make a case that it connotes organizational closure. However, there is no evidence beyond this to suggest such a linkage between the two constructs.

Cf. : closure, operational closure, organizational closure

(i) through their interactions and transformations regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it as a concrete unity in the space in which they exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network. (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 135, Cf. : Varela, 1979, p. 13)

Any unity meeting these specifications is an autopoietic machine / system, and any such autopoietic system realized in the physical space is a living system. The particular substantiation of a given unity -- its structure -- is not a sufficient factor for making the system "living". The key feature of a living system is maintenance of its organization, i.e, preservation of the relational network which defines it as a systemic unity. Phrased another way, '...autopoietic systems operate as homeostatic systems that have their own organization as the critical fundamental variable that they actively maintain constant.' (Maturana, 1975, p. 318)

Varela, Maturana & Uribe (1974) provide a concise set of criteria for autopoietic machine, arranged as a 6-point key by which one may proceed step-by-step in evaluating autopoiesis for a given unity. This key is illustrated in Table AutoKey below.

TABLE AUTOKEY: A Six-Step Key for Determining Whether a Given Unity is Autopoietic (Varela, Maturana & Uribe, 1974, pp. 192-193)
1. Determine if: The unity has identifiable boundaries (via interactions)	If so: Proceed to 2.
	If not: "The unity is indescribable and we can say nothing." (p. 192)
2. Determine if: "...there are constitutive elements of the unity, that is, components of the unity." (p. 192)	If so: Proceed to 3.
	If not: "...the unity is an unanalyzable whole and therefore not an autopoietic system." (p. 192)
3. Determine if: ...the unity is a mechanistic system, that is, the components properties are capable of satisfying certain relations that determine in the unity the interactions and transformations of these components." (p. 192)	If so: Proceed to 4.
	If not: "...the unity is not an autopoietic system." (p. 193)
4. Determine if: "...the components that constitute the boundaries of the unity constitute these boundaries through preferential neighborhood relations and interactions between themselves, as determined by their properties in the space of their interactions." (p. 193)	If so: Proceed to 5.
	If not: "...you do not have an autopoietic unity because you are determining its boundaries, not the unity itself." (p. 193)
5. Determine if: "...the components of the boundaries of the unity are produced by the interactions of the components of the unity, either transformation of previously produced components, or by transformations and/or coupling of non-component elements that enter the unity through its boundaries." (p. 193)	If so: Proceed to 6.
	If not: "...you do not have an autopoietic unity." (p. 193)
6. Determine if: "...all the other components of the unity are also produced by the interactions of its components as in 5.	If so: "...you have an autopoietic unity in the space in which its components exist." (p. 193, emphasis in the original)
	If not: "...and there are components in the unity not produced by components of the unity as in 5., or if there are components of the unity which do not participate in the production of other components, you do not have an autopoietic unity." (p. 193)

Autopoietic machines are the opposite of allopoietic machines, which are defined in terms of a purpose other than maintenance of their own organization. However, an observer can ascribe allopoietic ( allo-referred) status to an autopoietic machine within a subsuming context. Autopoietic machines may be described or manipulated as components of "...a larger system that defines the independent events which perturb them ... [and] can in fact be integrated into a larger system as a component allopoietic machine, without any alteration in its autopoietic organization." (Varela, 1979, p. 16) (See Also: higher-order, second-order, third-order) Conversely, an observer may analytically decompose an autopoietic machine, treating each of its "...partial homeostatic and regulatory mechanisms as allopoietic machines (submachines) by defining their input and output surfaces." (Varela, 1979, p. 17) Such a decomposition does not sum up (as a collection of allopoietic submachines) to an appropriate description of autopoietic machines, because it "...does not reveal the nature of the domain of interactions that ... [autopoietic machines] ... define as concrete entities operating in the physical universe." (Varela, 1979, p. 17)

Cf. : autonomy , autopoiesis , autonomous machine (system), machine

Cf. : living organization, organization , organization of the living

"An autopoietic organization constitutes a closed domain of relations specified only with respect to the autopoietic organization that these relations constitute, and thus it defines a space in which it can be realized as a concrete system, a space whose dimensions are the relations of production of the components that realize it."

(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 135)

Note that this "autopoietic space" is not isomorphic with the general physical space which is the context for realization of the composite unity . Perhaps the best interpretation is to consider an autopoietic space to be analogous to a state space (a depictive construct for a system's attributes). Maturana and Varela (1980, pp. 90 ff.) ascribe three dimensions to the autopoietic space, corresponding to the three classes of relations of production.

Cf. : domain, relations of production, space

See autopoietic machine

Cf. : autopoiesis (2.), theory of autopoiesis, autopoiesis theory, biology of cognition, Santiago theory

See autopoietic machine

"The fundamental operation that an observer can perform is an operation of distinction, the specification of an entity by operationally cleaving it from a background."

(Maturana, 1978, p. 55)

As such, this term is used more or less colloquially, and not as a formal alternative to (e.g.) ambience or medium.

"All the peculiar characteristics of the different kinds of organisms are superimposed on this basic circularity and are subservient to it, securing its continuance through successive interactions in an always changing environment." (Maturana, 1970a, p. 5)

For a living system, "...its identity is maintained as long as the basic circularity that defines the system as a unit of interactions remains unbroken." (Maturana, 1970a, p. 5)

Cf. : circularity, circular organization

1. (With respect to a system observed):

"Any operation or change in operation of an organism in relation to an environment, in any domain in which the observer distinguishes this operation or change in operation, is a behavior or action in this domain."

(Maturana, 1989)

The "...changes of a living being's position or attitude, which an observer describes as movements or actions in relation to a certain environment." (Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 136) As such, behavior is an observer-ascribed description of the observed system's apparent transformations within the similarly observer-dependent environment in which the observation occurs.

"...[T]he behavior of an organism is only a description that the observer does of a sequence of postural changes (structural) that the organism exhibits in relation to the medium in which it is observed. These postural changes are expressions of the structural dynamics of the organism, and they appear with the participation of the nervous system when it exists."

(Maturana, 1987, p. 322)

This last quoted passage points to the necessity of bearing in mind that behavior (as ascribed by an observer) must be qualified with respect to the same phenomenal domain juxtaposition as applies to any observation of a composite unity. The following passage illustrates this point, as Maturana discusses the linkage of the living system's two phenomenal domains of realization (as both simple and composite unity) through the cognitive domain of the observer:

"Behaviour, as a relation between a living system operating as a whole and the medium operating as an independent entity, does not take place in the anatomical/physiological domain of the organism, but depends on it. In other words, anatomical/physiological phenomena are necessary for behaviour to happen, but do not determine it because they are involved in the operation of only one of the participants of the dynamics of relations that constitutes it, namely, the living system. It is only the observer that conserves a double look by attending simultaneously, or in succession, to the structural dynamics of a system and to its relations as a whole, who can speak of a generative relation between the processes of the structural dynamics of a living system (anatomy and physiology) and the phenomena of its domain of behaviour."

(Maturana, 1995)

We often overlook these observer-dependent factors when we take observations of an organism's / system's apparent transformations to support an explanation of those transformational events in mentalistic or psychologistic terms. By doing so, we are in fact projecting onto the observed transformational events an explanatory mechanism which is an artifact of our observation. Maturana provides a lucid illustration of this in discussing perception:

"Since the observer distinguishes the organism as a system that moves in a medium, conserving necessarily its structural correspondence with it (adaptation) ... , the observer can distinguish behaviors that appear in the organism associated to its interactions. It is in this context of the association between behavior and medium configured by this distinction that the word perception is habitually used, supposing that such behaviors emerge from the determination of the organism (or of its nervous system), in the level of the sensorial encounter, by an external object."

(Maturana, 1987, p. 322)

The expansion of this basic construct to encompass complex behavioral phenomena proceeds with regard to the typical allusions to circularity and domanial qualification:

"Every kind of behavior is realized through operations that may or may not be applied recursively. If recursion is possible in a particular kind of behavior and if it leads to cases of behavior of the same kind, then a closed generative domain of behavior is produced. There are many examples: Human dance is one, human language, another."

(Maturana, 1978, p. 52)

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2. (With respect to the observer):

The "... referential and deterministic sequence of states of nervous activity, in which each state determines the next one within the same frame of reference." (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 52) More generally, Maturana characterizes the fundament for an ascription of "behavior" (1. above) as the ongoing mediation of the nervous system between the organism's receptor and effector surfaces. (Cf. Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 26)

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3.

A term used in the more or less colloquial sense of an organism's "function" or "performance." (Cf. Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 31)

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4.

In one specific case, 'behavior' appears as a synonym for conduct (from which this term is more commonly distinguished). This occurs in Maturana and Guiloff (1980, p. 139):

"(v) Conduct or behaviour. The interactions in which it is seen to enter as well as the active relations that a living system is seen to adopt while operating (realizing its autopoiesis) within a given context, and which are described by an observer with reference to this context, constitute its conduct or behaviour."

Perhaps the most concentrated treatment of "behavior" -- particularly insofar as it is a phenomenon subject to observation -- is to be found in Maturana and Guiloff (1980). In this paper, the authors make a distinction between those behaviors which an observer might distinguish as acquired / learned versus innate / instinctive. They take care to point out that this distinction has no necessary bearing on the fundamental explanation of behavior put forth in autopoietic theory:

"If two living systems have isomorphic structures, then their respective domains of states as well as their respective domains of perturbations are also isomorphic, regardless of whether the structure of one living system was inherited while the structure of the other was acquired during its ontogeny. The result is that these two living systems under isomorphic systems of perturbations undergo isomorphic changes of states that are seen as equivalent conducts by an observer."

(Maturana & Guiloff, 1980, p. 139)

In both cases, the observed behavior of each system is a result of their structure-specified responses to perturbation. This structural determination is the central (and only) explanation needed in the context of autopoietic theory.

"...[T]he distinction that we make between instinctive and learned behaviours has significance only if referred to the different origins of the individual structures of the organisms concerned (instinctive if inherited and learned if acquired during ontogeny), and not to the manner in which the structure of an organism determines its behaviour."

(Maturana & Guiloff, 1980, p. 139)

Cf. : behavioral coupling, conduct, domain of behavioral phenomena

"...the autopoietic conduct of an organism A becomes a source of deformation for an organism B, and the compensatory behavior of organism B acts, in turn, as a source of deformation of organism A, whose compensatory behavior acts again as a source of deformation of B, and so on recursively until the coupling is interrupted."

(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 120)

For all practical purposes, this term can be considered an informal synonym for reciprocal structural coupling, albeit it a synonym framed from a distinct referential vantage. The primary basis for differentiating the constructs is that one is framed with respect to behavior and the other with respect to structure . The focus of the former is the organism's attitudinal (or other parametric) status with respect to its discerned environment, and the focus of the latter is the internal constitution of the organism.

The complementarity of referential framing evident between behavioral and structural coupling is analogous to that between deformation and perturbation. Perhaps it is no more than a derived effect of the literature's "ontogeny", but it's interesting to point out that the canonical 1970's treatments of behavioral coupling typically invoke deformation, whereas the more numerous treatments of structural coupling typically invoke perturbation. Crudely put for the sake of illustration, the former case invokes a structural status to explain something framed as an event, while in the latter case invokes an event to explain something framed with regard to the participating systems' structures.

Cf. : structural coupling, deformation, perturbation, consensual domain

As discussed by Varela (Goguen & Varela, 1978; Varela, 1979), one of two alternative observational vantages on a system and its operation(s) (the other being recursive view). The behavioral view "...reduces a system to its input-output performance or behavior, and reduces the environment to inputs to the system..." and the "...effect of outputs on environment is not taken into account...". In contrast, (with respect to a given system) the recursive view "...emphasizes the mutual interconnectedness of its components..." and "... arises when emphasis is placed on the system's internal structure." (Goguen & Varela, 1978, p. 34; Varela, 1979, p. 86)

"...[T]he behavioral view arises when emphasis is placed on the environment, and recursive view arises when emphasis is placed on the system's internal structure.

If [via the recursive view -- Ed. ] we stress the autonomy of a system S_i ... then the environmental influences become perturbations (rather than inputs) which are compensated for through the underlying recursive interdependence of the system's components ... Each such component, however, is treated behaviorally, in terms of some input-output description.

The recursive viewpoint is more sophisticated than the behavioral, since it involves the simultaneous consideration of three different levels [i.e.: component / system-whole / environment -- Ed. ], whereas the behavioral strictly speaking involves only two [i.e.: system-whole / environment -- Ed. ]. ... [E]xpressing interest in how the system achieves its behavior through the interdependent action of its parts adds a new distinction, between the system and its parts."

(Goguen & Varela, 1978, p. 34)

The cognitive point of view (CPOV) conforming to the behavioral view is illustrated in Tableau BehView below. A summary illustration of the dichotomy between behavioral and recursive views can be found in Figure CPOV, located within the entry for cognitive point of view.

TABLEAU BehView: Behavioral View of a System S
Cognitive Point of View	A cognitive point of view (CPOV) specifies the distinctions, indications, and basic stance via which an observer engages the 'world' intersecting her cognitive domain. The 'focus' or 'referential crosshairs' are set in the medium of engagement, in what would be the environment for any system S in that medium.
In Terms of Description ...	With the focus set in the environment, system S is apprehended and engaged as a simple unity. Dynamic transformations are apprehended as such in the environment, and in terms of this environment (e.g., as distortions in the environment's referential matrix, vis a vis the observer).
In Terms of Explanation ...	The dynamic transformations are explained as phenomena framed with regard to the environment. The relationship of system S to these phenomena can not be explained except in terms of "import / export". System S remains opaque to explanation, and is attributed the character of a processor of the phenomena 'imported' and/or 'exported' (which are themselves re-framed as 'inputs' and/or 'outputs' to/from system S).

Although the foundation for the behavioral / recursive view dichotomy can be discerned in the primary literature going back to Maturana (1970a), it is neither so explicitly addressed, nor even invoked, as in the Varela sources cited here. Maturana's subsequent analyses of phenomena such as languaging and (most particularly) the hierarchical evolution of self-consciousness through recursive linguistic behavior could have been considerably more lucid had this (or an equivalent) logical accounting for indexicality been employed.

Cf. : cognitive point of view, recursive view

1.

A term which appears colloquially in The Tree of Knowledge (Maturana & Varela, 1992) as an apparent synonym for 'object', 'entity', and/or 'unity'. Cf. p. 40:

"The act of indicating any being, object, thing, or unity involves making an act of distinction ... Each time we refer to anything ... we are specifying a criterion of distinction, which indicates what we are talking about and specifies its properties as being, unity, or object."

---

2.

Used in a more specific sense, a term connoting a specimen of a living system -- typically in the phrase "living being".

Nowhere in the primary literature is 'being' defined in such a way as to give it any special connotation distinct from 'unity' or 'entity'. Similarly, the primary literature does not explicitly address 'being' in any specific sense as an ontic unit (i.e., a being) or as an ontological state or quality of existence (i.e., being). As such, the often-suggested parallels or linkages between autopoietic theory and (e.g.) Heideggerian phenomenological philosophy are not explicitly suggested by any invocation of the term 'being' by Maturana and/or Varela.

Cf. : entity, unity

"...[A]utopoietic unities specify biological phenomenology as the phenomenology proper of those unities with features distinct from physical phenomenology. This is so, not because autopoietic unities go against any aspect of physical phenomenology -- since their molecular components must fulfill all physical laws -- but because the phenomena they generate in functioning as autopoietic unities depend on their organization and the way this organization comes about, and not on the physical nature of their components (which only determine their space of existence."

(Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 51)

Given this focus by Varela, the attribution of a biological phenomenology to a composite unity will be contingent on the level of composition at which autopoiesis is realized. In other words, a composite unity which either (a) subsumes components which (in and of themselves) exhibit autopoiesis and/or (b) exhibits autonomy as a whole may or may not exhibit a biological phenomenology, subject to certain conditions:

"[I]f a new unity is produced that is not autopoietic, its phenomenology, which will necessarily depend on its organization, will be biological or not according to its dependence on the autopoiesis of its components, and will accordingly depend or not depend on the maintenance of these as autopoietic units. If the new unity is autopoietic, then its phenomenology is biological and obviously depends on the maintenance of its autopoiesis, which in turn may or may not depend on the autopoiesis of its components."

(Varela, 1979, p. 31)

This passage is not restricted to higher-order autopoietic systems, in which autopoiesis is realized at two or more levels of composition. A higher-order autopoietic system would be of the sort addressed in the final sentence -- where the composite unity is autopoietic, provided the maintenance of the composite depended on the autopoiesis of its (autopoietic) components.

Cf. : component, higher-order (autopoietic system), biological phenomenon, mechanical phenomenology, phenomenology, statical phenomenology

The earliest paper in the primary literature (Maturana, 1970) begins by stating, "Cognition is a biological phenomenon and can only be understood as such; any epistemological insight in the domain of knowledge requires this understanding." (p. 3) This opening declaration paved the way for the theoretical development of the biology of cognition. Once the core construct of autopoiesis was introduced and fleshed out, biological phenomena themselves would then be delineated with respect to the product of their scrutiny:

"... [A] phenomenon is a biological phenomenon only to the extent that it depends in one way or another on the autopoiesis of one or more physical autopoietic unities."

(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 135)

[Biological phenomena] "...are necessarily phenomena of relations between processes which satisfy the autopoiesis of the participant living systems. Accordingly, under no circumstances is a biological phenomenon defined by the properties of its component elements."

(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 113)

"...[A] biological phenomenon will be any phenomenon that involves the autopoiesis of at least one living being."

(Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 52)

Cf. : biological phenomenology

Cf. : autopoiesis (2.), autopoiesis theory, autopoietic theory, Santiago theory, theory of autopoiesis

The recourse to "boundaries" is based on the idea that autopoietic systems, through their processes of self-production, delineate a "topology" in the space of their operations. If the observer observes an autopoietic entity with respect to the dimensions in which its processes of topological production are manifested, this topological boundary is discernible via the closure of the entity's constituent processes. As such, the construct of "boundary" connotes the self-circumscription of an organizationally-closed system in the context of its environment (as ascribed by an observer). A "boundary" is not, then, strictly held to be a discernible "sheath" or "shell" (i.e., a bounding component of the system's structure ), though such structural manifestations of the system's boundary may be evident.

Though intriguingly salient to autopoietic theory, the calculus of indications is external to the primary corpus of autopoietic theory, and it will not be discussed in any further detail within the Encyclopaedia. Readers interested in exploring this substantial campaign by Varela are encouraged to read Laws of Form, Principles of Biological Autonomy (Varela, 1979), and/or the papers cited herein. Additional materials relevant to the calculus of indications are listed in the Observer Web's Bibliography and Guide to Internet Resources.

More specifically, Maturana considered it misleading because it obscured:

• "... the actual appreciation of the sufficiency of the notion of property as defined by the distinctive operation performed by the observer when specifying a unity ...

• ... the understanding of the dependency of the identity of the unity on the distinctive operation that specified it.

• ... the understanding of the phenomenal domains as determined by the properties of the unities that generate them

• ... the non-intersection of the phenomenal domains generated by the operation of a composite unity as a simple unity in a medium and by the operation of its components as components."

(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. xviii, vertical spacing added for readability)

"We call the structural changes that occur in a system with conservation of organization, changes of state; and those that occur with loss of organization, disintegrations."

(Maturana, Mpodozis & Letelier, 1995)

"Living systems as they exist on earth today are characterized by exergonic metabolism, growth and internal molecular replication, all organized in a closed causal circular process that allows for evolutionary change in the way the circularity is maintained, but not for the loss of the circularity itself. ... This circular organization constitutes a homeostatic system whose function is to produce and maintain this very same circular organization by determining that the components that specify it are those whose synthesis or maintenance it secures. ...Furthermore, this circular organization defines a living system as a unit of interactions and is essential for its maintenance as a unit ..."

(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 9)

Cf. : autopoiesis , circularity, homeostasis, organization

1.

A term employed to connote closure, particular with respect to form (e.g., organization ) or dynamics (e.g., operations or processes). The construct of "circularity" occurs frequently in the literature as a description for a process or path which is closed upon itself (in the sense of eventually returning to the point of its origin). This in turn sets the stage for a necessary cyclicity in systems exhibiting such circular form: "The circularity of their organization continuously brings them back to the same internal state (same with respect to the cyclic process)." (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 10)

Because autonomous and autopoietic systems exhibit organizational closure, circularity and cyclicity are important aspects of their description. "It is the circularity of its organization that makes a living system a unit of interactions, and it is this circularity that it must maintain in order to remain a living system and to retain its identity through different interactions." (Maturana, 1970a, p. 5; Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 9) This explains why Maturana made circularity a central theme beginning with his earliest writings on a novel approach to analyzing living systems. "All the peculiar characteristics of the different kinds of organisms are superimposed on this basic circularity and are subservient to it, securing its continuance through successive interactions in an always changing environment." (Maturana, 1970a, p. 5)

Because such systems are self-organizing, -referential, -maintaining, etc., their operations cannot be fully explained without recourse to circularity. As such, "circularity" is a generic explanatory theme necessitated by the form of Maturana and Varela's approach, and it is a necessary theme in approaching self-organization . Jantsch (1980, Chapter 10) extensively explores circularity (and cyclicity) in this general sense.

---

Cf. : basic circularity, circular organization,

---

2.

A term connoting a paradoxical state of referential or explanatory "looping" -- specifically, that state of affairs confronting all scientific studies of cognition -- that the object of study (the human "mind") is also the instrument by which that study is conducted. Maturana alludes to this sense of circularity most succinctly in saying of cognition and language (as instruments of addressing cognition and language themselves):

"These two experiential conditions are my starting point because I must be in them in any explanatory attempt; they are my problem because I choose to explain them; and they are my unavoidable instruments because I must use cognition and language in order to explain cognition and language."

(Maturana, 1988a)

The most specific label for this particular sense (of referential / explanatory paradox) is fundamental circularity.

---

3.

A term used to negatively characterize a path of argumentation or course of reasoning -- typically on the figurative basis of said path's 'circling back on itself' to explain or demonstrate something which in fact was employed earlier as a foundational element. An example is the common colloquial indictment of 'presuming as given that which one sets out to prove'. Given the above-cited basic and fundamental circularities which Maturana and Varela's chosen foci entail, critics of their work have often claimed that their proffered line(s) of explanation, by virtue of following the circular contours of their subject matter, are guilty of this presumptively erroneous / fallacious method.

Frankly, most such charges appear to derive from a confusion of explanatory circularity (i.e, 'circular reasoning') with the above-cited intrinsic forms of circularity. To be fair, however, some further comments should be offered as a more substantive basis for rebuttal. Because Maturana's formulations of 'reason', 'rationality', and 'theory' all rely on the general construct of 'explanation', these comments will be framed with regard to this last, and most relevant, topic.

To the extent that 'circular reasoning' is isomorphic with 'explaining exactly what you already assume', one might well rebut such claims by pointing out that a priori assumptions (objects, values, claims) are relegated by Maturana (e.g., 1991) to the class of philosophical explanations -- the opposite of the class of scientific explanations into which he claims his theories properly fall. To the extent 'circular reasoning' connotes pre-specification of what is to be addressed, one must concede this is an intrinsic component of Maturana's scientific method (as the first element in his criteria of validation for scientific explanations). However, this would lead to 'circular reasoning' only to the extent that the phenomenon initially specified as the focus of explanation was itself employed as a component of its own explanation. Maturana specifically forbids such a thing when he writes: "A proposed explanation which explicitly or implicitly includes the phenomenon to be explained as a feature of the proposed system [i.e., model offered as the explanatory hypothesis -- Ed.], is not a scientific explanation." (Maturana & Guiloff, 1980, p. 137)

"The organization of a system, then, specifies the class identity of a system, and must remain invariant for the class identity of the system to remain invariant: if the organization of a system changes, then its identity changes and it becomes a unity of another kind."

(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. xx)

"...[T]he organization of a composite unity specifies the class of entities to which it belongs. It follows that the concept or generic name that we use to refer to a class of entities points to the organization of the composite unities that are members of the class."

(Maturana, 1978)

Another allusion to "class" concerns the character of cognition afforded by an autopoietic system's circular organization, "... which treats every interaction and the internal state that it generates as if it were to be repeated, and as if an element of a class. (Maturana & Varela, 1980, pp. 49-50) Most specifically, when we as observers distinguish a composite unity , we are in effect distinguishing a class. "This situation, in which we recognize implicitly or explicitly the organization of an object when we indicate it or distinguish it, is universal in the sense that it is something we do constantly as a basic cognitive act, which consists no more and no less than in generating classes of any type." (Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 43)

Both the cited general and specific intersections of "class" and cognition imply a primary generality of orientational / referential / distinction-making behavior. Phrased another way, this implies that the observer observes from a fundamentally general stance, rather than lacing together multiple specific instances to arrive at the general. This implication is nowhere more explicitly reinforced than when Maturana and Varela state "... functionally, for a living system every experience is the experience of a general case, and it is the particular case, not the general one, which requires many independent experiences in order that it be specified through the intersection of various classes of interactions." (Maturana & Varela, 1980, pp. 49-50)

These allusions to "class" are invoked for the purposes of discussion and explanation. Nowhere in the literature is there an extensive treatment of whether (much less how) this could relate to (e.g.) discernment of "classes" by an observer in (e.g.) ordering her cognitive domain, making inferences, etc. As such, the notion of "class" is not pursued (to any great extent) in the direction of linking it to set-theoretical notions descriptive of cognitive (particularly inferential) phenomena. Such discussion is limited to only a few instances (e.g., Maturana & Varela, 1980, pp. 49 ff. -- Cf. : inference)

This relatively low attention to developing the role of "class" in autopoietic theory is not surprising, given that a dominant theme of the theory is the autonomy of the subject system. From such a perspective, it is sufficient to invoke the "class"-like character of interaction as the basis for behavioral / orientational flexibility. Fuller treatment of "class" in a formal (particularly a set- theoretic) sense lies beyond the scope of autopoietic theory's focus, because it would entail (a) requisite characterization of that lying beyond or outside the autonomous system, and (b) an allusion to some abstract feature of class subsumption -- in effect what Varela calls a symbolic description.

Cf. : inference, organization , unity

Cf. : class, identity, organization

Critics of Maturana and Varela have interpreted the defining closure of autonomous / autopoietic systems to indicate these are "closed systems" in the traditional sense. This is quite simply not the case, and results from (a) a misinterpretation of Maturana and Varela's terminology and (b) inattention to the manner in which the explanatory constructs underlying a traditional ascription of system "openness" (e.g., feedback) are addressed in autopoietic theory.

"Please note that when we speak of organizational closure, by no means do we imply interactional closure, i.e., the system in total isolation. We do assume that every system will maintain endless interactions with the environment which will impinge and perturb it. If this were not so, we could not even distinguish it."

(Varela & Goguen, 1978, p. 294, emphasis in the original)

Cf. : closure, feedback, organizational closure, stability

It is important to note that this property of 'closure' does not make autonomous / autopoietic systems 'closed' in the classic cybernetic sense of isolated from the environment or impervious to environmental influence. 'Closure' doesn't mean autonomous systems are unresponsive; it only means that their changes of state in response to changes in their medium are realized and propagated solely within the network of processes constituting them (as they are defined). The difference has more to do with the way a system is defined than how that system (once defined) operates.

"Please note that when we speak of organizational closure, by no means do we imply interactional closure, i.e., the system in total isolation. We do assume that every system will maintain endless interactions with the environment which will impinge and perturb it. If this were not so, we could not even distinguish it."

(Varela & Goguen, 1978, p. 294, emphasis in the original)

A fuller explanation of this point can be obtained in Varela (1979, pp. 56 ff.), who frames the issue in terms of delineating a systemic unity such that the scope of the defined unity subsumes all processes which operationally define it. For example, in organizational closure the network of defining processes is internal to the system as circumscribed. This includes those processes of system "feedback", which in traditional cybernetics are defined as external to a system -- in either the sense that (a) they are channels for "information" from without (i.e., the 'environment') or (b) they are defined as extrinsic or secondary to the constitutive nature of the system.

Cf. : feedback, organizational closure, operational closure, stability

"Every autonomous system is organizationally closed."

(Varela, 1979, p. 58, emphasis in the original)

"Every system-whole is organizationally closed."

(Varela & Goguen, 1978, p. 293)

The Closure Thesis is a central component of Varela's solo theoretical work of the 1970's. Both the 'system-whole' and 'autonomous system' constructs cited above denote composite unities of the sort which 'systems theory' has taken as its topical focus. The emphasis on organization clearly derives from the seminal work in delineating autopoietic machines, and the usage of that term is entirely consistent with its invocation here. The Closure Thesis represents an axiomatic basis upon which to extend the notion of 'organization' and its closure as evidenced in those systems (both natural and artificial) of interest to the stature of a feature definitive of those same systems. The following excerpt from Varela & Goguen (1978) summarizes the rationale for such an extension:

"Question: What have we learned from the descriptions of system-wholes in the last decade? Answer: That in order to account for the coherence of the observed systems, their constitutive interactions must be mutual and reciprocal, so as to become an interconnected network.

There seems to be plenty of evidence to substantiate this view of system-wholes. The traditional source of examples has been living systems. Surely in them the circularity of interconnectedness is more striking than anywhere else, both topologically and functionally. But, biological systems are not unique in this respect, and the current interest in ecological wholeness and world models are testimony to our growing understanding of this. ...

In terms of organization, then, empirical observation reveals that the system-wholes are organizationally closed: their organization is a circular network of interactions rather than a tree of hierarchical processes.

Conversely, then, if we are trying to make more precise our notion of a whole, we propose to make these empirical results a guideline. That is, we propose to take the circular and mutual interconnectedness of organization, or organizational closure, as the characterization of system-wholes."

(Varela & Goguen, 1978, pp. 292-293, emphasis in the original)

This thesis was then developed in the light of organizational closure itself as well as the corollary constructs of (a) criteria of distinction / indication (by which a system-whole is identified by an observer), and (b) stability (as specifically re-defined). After addressing the criticisms typically leveled at their approach (cf. Note below), they conclude:

"In summary: we have the three interrelated notions of criteria of indication, systemic stability, and organizational closure. They appear related thus: given a criterion for distinction, system-wholes can be identified by their stable properties, and empirical experience tells us that such stability is due to organizational closure. Whence the Closure Thesis, that can be now restated in a second, less compact form:

Every (distinguishable) system-whole is (distinguishable through its stable properties arising from it being) organizationally closed."

(Varela & Goguen, 1978, p. 295)

NOTE: For more detailed discussion of Varela & Goguen's rebuttal of two conventional criticisms as they apply to the Closure Thesis, i.e.: (a) 'Are organizationally closed unities 'closed systems'?'; and (b) 'Aren't 'inputs' and 'outputs' necessary components of a system?', refer to the entries for operational closure and feedback, respectively.

By declaring the Closure Thesis and exploring its ramifications, Varela (alone and in concert with J. Goguen) generated a basis for critiquing classical cybernetics / engineering approaches to systems. In these earlier approaches, the systems' essential circularity is not acknowledged, or is acknowledged only in terms of imperfect constructs such as feedback. By not addressing circularity as an intrinsic element of their models, adherents of these approaches are left to lay out specifications of a system in 'linear' terms / referents -- a tactic only made possible by 'punctuating' (to use Bateson's terminology) circular paths and flows with constructs such as 'input' and 'output' so as to filter out circularity in favor of more tractable (if less faithful) models and schemata. Given the distortions which may ensue, this 'punctuation' may be more properly considered 'puncturing'.

The Closure Thesis requires one to prioritize the subject system's organizational closure, which in turn mandates direct attention to this circularity. What, then, might this connote for reforming systems analysis and engineering?

"The Closure Thesis, we submit, is a methodological guideline: if you are to study a system, assume it has a closed organization, analyze individual pathways until a reconstruction of the network is obtained, and then putting all of these circuits together simultaneously, see what kinds of stability they can generate. The i/o [i.e., input/output -- Ed.] approach is, in fact, a moment in this process, insofar as we fix certain modes of interaction with a purpose in mind."

(Varela & Goguen, 1978, p. 318)

Cf. : closure, feedback, organization, organizational closure, operational closure, stability, system, system-whole

"A notion which represents the interactions of the observer, not a phenomenon operative in the observed domain. A mapping of a process that occurs in the space of autopoiesis onto a process that occurs in the space of human beings (heteropoiesis) and, thus, not a reformulation of the phenomenon."

(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 135)

The term "coding" is generally used to denote the symbolic inter-mappings associated with a cognitivist view of communication (e.g., the metaphor of the tube). The autopoietic account of communication as languaging denies that coding is the essence of such communicative interactions.

Cf. : communication, language, languaging, metaphor of the tube

"Cognition is a biological phenomenon and can only be understood as such; any epistemological insight in the domain of knowledge requires this understanding."

(Maturana, 1970a, p. 3)

"Any understanding of the cognitive process must account for the observer and his role in it."

(Maturana, 1970a, p. 4)

These two declarations from the earliest document in the literature base succinctly delineate the foundation for Maturana and Varela's autopoietic account of those events or phenomena we term "cognition". First, whatever cognition may be, it is most definitely a biological phenomenon -- i.e., it is a characteristic of those systems we label "living", and which have been made the province of biological science. Second, there is no explanation for "cognition" which avoids being discerned, analyzed, or expressed by one of the living systems manifesting that selfsame phenomenon. Addressing cognition as an impersonal or objective subject, absent grounding in the unavoidable groundedness of experience, cannot possibly encompass the topic.

Maturana and Varela proceeded from the perspective of individual organisms' cognitive activities as a function of their embodied experience. For them, cognition is a consequence of circularity and complexity in the form of any system whose behavior realizes maintenance of that selfsame form. This shifts the weight of discussion from discernment of those active agencies and replicable actions through which a given process ("cognition") is conducted (the viewpoint of cognitivism) to the discernment of those features of an organism's form which determine that entity's engagement with its milieu. In other words, cognition is a matter of interacting in the manner(s) in which one is capable of interacting, not processing what is objectively there to be seen. "Living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process of cognition." (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 13)

In this view, cognition is a consequence of (structurally-realized and structurally-determined) interactions. "A cognitive system is a system whose organization defines a domain of interactions in which it can act with relevance to the maintenance of itself, and the process of cognition is the actual (inductive) acting or behaving in this domain." (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 13) More specifically:

"... for every living system the process of cognition consists in the creation of a field of behavior through its actual conduct in its closed domain of interactions, and not in the apprehension or the description of an independent universe. Our cognitive process (the cognitive process of the observer) differs from the cognitive processes of other organisms only in the kinds of interactions into which we can enter, ... and not in the nature of the cognitive process itself."

(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 49)

In other words, the foundation for the autopoietic view of cognition is not "information" as some quantum commodity available in the environment. Owing to this, autopoietic theory diverges from some interpolations of J. J. Gibson's (e.g., 1979) otherwise similar ecological approach (Cf. Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991, pp. 202-204). Unlike cognitivism, autopoietic theory does not rely upon a formalizable model of information or symbol processing (Cf. Varela, et al., 1991) to describe cognition as information processing or communication as a matter of coding. Autopoietic theory also diverges from "classical" cybernetics in the sense that it does not treat system behavior as being regulated by a traffic in "information" -- e.g., "feedback" -- See Also: Varela, 1979, p. 56).

Cf. : class, cognitive domain, description, explanation, inference, language, languaging, observer

"The domain of all the interactions in which an autopoietic system can enter without loss of identity is its cognitive domain; or, in other words, the cognitive domain of an autopoietic system is the domain of all the descriptions which it can possibly make"

(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 119)

This latter allusion to descriptions primarily applies only to an autopoietic system which can operate as an observer.

It is sometimes difficult to maintain a clear distinction between a system's cognitive domain and its domain of interactions (" the domain of all the deformations that it may undergo without loss of autopoiesis" (Ibid.)) or its phenomenological domain. This confusion derives in large part from the generality of their definitions. A phenomenological domain is a general explanatory construct denoting the realm specified by the properties of a unity or one or more classes of unities (Cf. Varela, 1979, pp. 46-47). Crudely stated, the phenomenological domain is the domain in which the unity is extant in and of itself -- the totality of its context of simple or static realization, and the background to its dynamic realization. A domain of interactions is a distinct explanatory construct denoting the realm specified by "...the particular mode through which its autopoiesis is realized in the space of its components, that is, by its structural coupling." (Varela, 1979, p. 47) Crudely stated, the domain of interactions is the domain in which the unity can act (change; undergo deformation). A cognitive domain, crudely stated, is the domain in which the unity can, and does, adapt in the course of its ontogeny.

Cf. : cognition, domain of interactions, description, phenomenological domain

"...treat cognitive phenomena (such as language or perception) as structural phenomena by formulating them as phenomena of ontogenic or phylogenic adaptation, resulting from ontogenic or phylogenic structural selection, rather than as phenomena of transfer of information, communication, or meaning. These, as semantic phenomena, cannot be handled by biology."

Cf. : semantic phenomena

"...[T]he establishment of system boundaries is inescapably associated with what I shall call a cognitive point of view, that is, a particular set of presuppositions and attitudes, a perspective, or a frame in the sense of Bateson ... or Goffman ...; in particular, it is associated with some notion of value, or interest. It is also linked up with the cognitive capacities (sensory capabilities, knowledge background) of the distinctor. Conversely, the distinctions made reveal the cognitive capabilities of the distinctor. It is in this way that biological and social structures exhibit their coherence..."

(Varela, 1979, p. 85; Goguen & Varela, p. 32)

Because the phrase 'cognitive point of view' is more commonly invoked by Varela than 'cognitive viewpoint', this will be the term employed for discussion herein. For the sake of economy, it will be abbreviated CPOV.

A CPOV, therefore, circumscribes the particular 'layout' or 'topology' of an observer's observing situation. This circumscription specifies the focus of observational engagement (i.e., where the observer's 'referential cross hairs' are targeted), and this in turn specifies the topology of the observer's immediately-accessible domain of referentiality. These constraining or qualifying features are best illustrated in the context in which the CPOV was originally introduced. In Goguen and Varela (1978), the discursive focus was on "...the role which distinction plays in the creation and recognition of systems." (Goguen & Varela, 1978, p. 32) As such, they introduce and employ the notion of CPOV in the course of delineating how such observational constraints set the stage for a hierarchy of system levels (of discernment). This in turn set the stage for discussion of issues such as the dichotomies of autonomy / control and recursive / behavioral views on a system and its operations.

A summary illustration of this construct, including comparison of the behavioral and recursive subcategories, is given in Figure CPOV below.

Cf. : behavioral view, observer, observer-community, phenomenology, phenomenological domain, recursive view

"A cognitive system is a system whose organization defines a domain of interactions in which it can act with relevance to the maintenance of itself ..."

(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 13)

This is the basis for the process of cognition, as delineated in autopoietic theory. It is important to note that this basic definition frames capacity for cognition in terms of a system's formal character (its organization ) insofar as this is reflected in the scope of events into which it can enter while maintaining this character. This divorces autopoietic theory's notion of cognition from those elements most commonly cited in conventional, cognitivistic accounts: "information", 'symbols', and the "processing" of these things as the hallmark of cognitive activity.

Cf. : cognition, cognitive domain

1. [General usage]

Those "...coordinated behaviors mutually triggered among the members of a social unity." (Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 193) The phenomenon ascribed to the inter-organism behavioral coordination which an observer construes as communicative. (Cf. Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 195)

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2. [Specific usage, in contrast with simple "interaction"]

In this more specific usage, the term "communication" is employed to analyze what distinguishes "communicative" behaviors (See Also: 1.).

In this usage, communication is behavior entailing orientation which is contrastively opposed to simple or automatic "interaction" wherein interactors are basically triggering each other's responses. In communication (in this sense), one organism orients "...the behavior of the other organism to some part of its domain of interactions different from the present interaction, but comparable to the orientation of that of the orienting organism." (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 27) Note that the orientation of interest is not necessarily to some external referent, but to some distinguishable subregion of the domain of interactions. "This can take place only if the domains of interactions of the two organisms are widely coincident; in this case no interlocked chain of behavior [i.e., no "interaction" in the simple sense -- Ed.] is elicited because the subsequent conduct of the two organisms depends on the outcome of independent, although parallel, interactions. (Maturana & Varela, 1980, pp. 27-28)

Cf. : orientation

"A chain of interlocked interactions such that although the conduct of each organism in each interaction is internally determined by its autopoietic organization, this conduct is for the other organism a source of compensable deformations."

(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 136)

Cf. : consensual domain, structural coupling, perturbation.

Cf. : explanation

Compensation is not "absolute" in the sense that any or all arbitrary parameters or ordering arrangements are recovered after deformation / perturbation. With regard to autopoietic systems in particular, compensation is sufficient if th